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INTRODUCTION
Recent research (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978;
Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & vonBaeyer, 1979) concerning cognitive
theories of depression has suggested that a person's causal attributions may be associated with the presence of depression.

Specific-

ally, it has been postulated that there is a "depressive attributional style" characterized by internal, stable and global attributions for bad outcomes and external, unstable and specific attributions for good outcomes.

In addition, the greater incidence of

depression in females as compared to males has been well-documented.
Also, a number of studies have found significant differences between
males and females in their causal attributions, with the suggestion
that females adopt the more "depressive" pattern.
The present study sought to review the relevant research in
these areas in order to develop hypotheses concerning the relationship among attributions, gender and depression.

In general, it was

predicted that differences in attributional style between males and
females account for differences in the incidence of depression.
In addition, careful examination of the results of previous
studies suggested that using instruments to assess attribution which
present subjects with hypothetical outcomes may weaken their power
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to detect a significant difference in attributional style.

It was

hypothesized that attributions made to a real-life event may
more closely reflect differences in the degree of depression than
do hypothetical event attributions.
These two major hypotheses were tested in an experiment in
which subjects were asked to complete a measure of depression, a
scale of attributional style using hypothetical outcomes and a
questionnaire concerning attributions made to the outcome of a realli fe academic examination.

In addition, the usefulness of weighting

attributional variables by the importance assigned to the event was
investigated.

A multiple regression format was used to analyze

the data and evaluate the stated hypotheses.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In their reformulation of the learned helplessness model of
depression, Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) proposed an application of attribution theory to account for several inadequacies in
the original model.

In general, the original model had proposed

that "learning that outcomes are uncontrollable results in three
deficits:

motivational, cognitive, and emotional" (Abramson, et al.,

1978, p. SO).

These three areas of deficit were seen to parallel

the types of behavioral symptoms often observed in human depression.
However, Abramson et al. (1978) deemed it necessary to introduce a
causal attributional process into the sequence of cognitive events
resulting in helplessness depressions.

Specifically, they proposed

that a person who perceives a present and past noncontingency
between responses and outcomes experiences helplessness.

The reform-

ulation "regards the attribution the individual makes for noncontingency between his acts and outcomes in the here and now as a determinant of his subsequent expectations for future noncontingency"
(Abramson et al., 1978, p. 50).

These attributions can be charac-

terized along three dimensions:

stable-unstable, global-specific,

and internal-external.

According to the reformulation, the relative

stability of the attribution influences the chronicity of the expectation of future helplessness.

The relative globality influences

the extent to which helplessness will be experienced in varied
3
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situatio~s.

Finally, the relative internality of the attribution

should determine the extent to which self-esteem is lowered by the
experience of helplessness.
One of the implications of this hypothesis is that there is
an identifiable "depressive attributional style."

As stated by

Abramson et al. (1978):
Individual differences probably exist in attributional style.
Those people who typically tend to attribute failure to
global, stable and internal factors should be most prone
to general and chronic helplessness depressions with low
self-esteem. (p. 68)
In a test of this assertion, Seligman, Abramson, Semmel and von
Baeyer (1979) had college student subjects complete the Beck Depression Inventory Short Form (BDI) and the Multiple Affect Adjective
Check List (MAACL).

Subjects also completed a measure called the

Scale of Attributional Style (SAS).

This device presented subjects

with twelve hypothetical life situations, six with good outcomes and
six with bad outcomes.

Subjects were asked to write down a major

cause for each hypothetical outcome and then asked to rate the
internality, stability and globality of each cause on seven-point
rating scales.

Also requested was a rating of the importance of each

event if it were to happen to the subject.

This rating was also

made on a seven-point scale.
To analyze results, Seligman et al. (1979) computed correla· tions between BDI and MAACL scores and various scores on the SAS.
Results indicated significant positive correlations between BDI and

5

MAACL scores and ratings of the internality, stability and of causes
chosen for bad outcomes.

Significant negative·correlations were

found between BDI scores and ratings of the internality and stability
of causes chosen for good outcomes.

MAACL scores did not correlate

significantly with SAS ratings for causes chosen for good outcomes.
These results imply that, relative to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects attributed bad outcomes to more internal, stable
and global causes and good outcomes to more external and unstable
causes.

These authors also calculated composite attributional

scores by summing ratings of internality, stability and globality
for good outcomes alone, and then for bad outcomes alone.

These

composite scores for bad outcomes correlated significantly and
positively with BDI scores, while composite scores for good outcomes correlated significantly and negatively with BDI scores.

This

implies that as the level of depression increased between subjects,
the internality, stability and globality or attributions for bad
outcomes increases, while the internality, stability and globality
of attributions for good outcomes decreases.
In addition, Seligman et al. (1979) felt that it would be
informative to compare subjects scoring at the upper and lower extremes on the BDI.

Upper quartile subjects (depressed, BDI_::.6) were

significantly more internal, stable and global in their attributions
for bad outcomes than were lower quartile subjects (nondepressed,
BDI<l).

Also, upper quartile subjects were more unstable (p <.017)

and somewhat more external (p <.19) than lower quartile subjects
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in their attributions for good outcomes.
The results of the Seligman et al. (1979) study suggest the
presence of an identifiable depressive attributional style in mild
to moderately depressed college students.

However, two major areas

of concern were not addressed in this study.

Both areas have rele-

vance to the investigation of attributional bias in depression.
The first of these concerns an hypothesized relationship between the
over-representation of females in depressed populations and gender
differences in the attribution of causality.

Although this issue was

tentatively addressed in the Abramson et al. (1978) reformulation,
the authors' thinking on this matter has never been publicly developed.

Secondly, there are serious issues concerning the validity

of the SAS-style questionnaire as a measure of attributional style
which need to be considered.

One of the chief issues is the hypo-

thetical nature of the responses generated by the SAS.

There may

be reason to believe that responses to hypothetical outcomes do not
accurately reflect a person's actual attributional style, a point to
be considered in detail later in this review.

These two areas of

concern will constitute the main focus of the present study.

The

remainder of this review will consider the relevant previous studies
and develop more specific questions and hypotheses concerning these
major issues.
Gender and Depression
Studies by Weissman and Klerman (1977), Winokur (1973), and
Winokur and Morrison (1973) have documented a clear difference in
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the incidence of depression, with depression being more connnon among
women than men.

Radloff (1975) administered an extensive question-

naire to a sample of over 2,500 subjects.

This questionnaire

included questions concerning depressive symptoms and detailed
biographical questions, including ones about possible precipitating
factors.

In general, results of this study indicated that single

marital status and disruption in the relations.hip to the head of the
household interacted with gender to produce a higher incidence of
depression among women.
Radloff and Rae (1979) made a more detailed analysis of Radloff' s (1975) data in order to determine if the difference in incidence was due to differences in susceptibility or to different
patterns of precipitating factors in men and women.

They found that

most of the simple precipitating factors associated with depression
related similarly to the presence of depression in both men and
women.

However, when these precipitating factors were used as co-

variates with gender in an analysis of covariance, the results were
of interest.

No single covariate, or combination of covariates

eliminated the gender differences in depression.

These results imply

that gender differences in the incidence of depression are the result
of a greater susceptibility among women, rather than an increased
exposure to various precipitating factors.

In their discussion of

results, Radloff and Rae (1979) suggest that "the cognitive dimension
of depression is . • • seen as a learned susceptibility factor
(p. 179)."
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Gender and Attributional Style
It has frequently been proposed that the learned factor
referred to by Radloff and Rae can, at least in part, be observed
in differences between males and females in their causal attributional patterns.

Dweck and her associates (e.g., Dweck, 1975, 1976;

Dweck & Bush, 1976; Dweck & Repucci, 1973) have done extensive research on attributional differences with elementary school students.
In one article, Dweck (1976) asserts that the evaluative behavior
of elementary school teachers lays the groundwork for later attributional differences.

She asserts that boys are criticized more

frequently by teachers for negative behavior in the classroom than
are girls.

However, girls are more frequently criticized by teachers

for poor academic performance.

Conversely, boys are praised when

they show specific academic competence, while girls are praised for
good deportment in the classroom.

Dweck feels that this differ-

ential treatment of boys and girls eventually results in different
attributions made for their academic failure and success.

She

observed that teachers attributed academic failure in boys to lack
of effort, while academic failure in girls is attributed more often
to lack of ability.

To the extent that these early evaluative

experiences become increasingly internalized as children proceed
through school, they can have a potentially crucial differential
effect on the ability of males and females to deal with failure
experiences.

Specifically, in line with the reformulation of learned

helplessness theory, attributions to a lack of ability are potentially more depressogenic than attributions to a lack of effort

9

because they are generally more stable and global.

While effort

and ability are both considered to be internal factors, the statement "I failed because I don't have the ability" seems to be much
more insidious than "I failed because I didn't try hard enough."
Dweck and Repucci (1973) had two experimenters give academic
problems to elementary school students.

The "success experimenter"

gave solvable problems to the subjects first, followed by the "failure experimenter," who gave unsolvable problems.

Then the failure

experimenter gave subjects a set of solvable problems.

Those

children who failed these solvable problems (or who showed a marked
decrement in performance) were those who tended to attribute failure
to task difficulty or to lack of ability.

However, males were more

likely to attribute their failures to lack of effort than were
females.

Also, females in general were more likely to show perfor-

mance decrements in the face of previous failure.

In addition,

Dweck (l975) found that attribution retraining could alleviate the
poor motivation reactions of children who had experienced failure.
Specifically, re-attributing prior failure to a lack of effort
resulted in subsequent improvements in performance.

It appears that

gender differences in attributions have their roots in the early
achievement experiences of children and the differential attributions made by evaluative figures.
Additional evidence concerning gender differences in attribution is found in a series of studies involving either self-attribution for performance or observers' attributions for the performance
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of others.

The self-attribution studies will be considered first.

Crandall, Katkovsky and Preston (1962) found that there were
gender differences in subjects' explanations of their own failures.
First through third grade female subjects tended to internalize the
blame for failure on an intellectual task, while males tended to
externalize and project the blame on others.
Nicholls (1975) investigated attributional bias in fourth
grade boys and girls.

Subjects were given false success or failure

feedback on an angle matching task.

Attributions for task perfor-

mance were elicited by means of a movable pie graph which allowed
subjects to make relative attributions to task ease (or difficulty),
effort, luck or ability.
and test tasks.

Measurements were made after both practice

Results for attributions on the practice task

indicated that girls attributed failure to low ability more than
they attributed success to high ability, while boys did not show
this pattern.

No effects for sex-of-subject were found for effort

attributions.

Boys attributed failure to bad luck more than girls

did, and boys, but not girls, showed more bad luck attributions
after failure than good luck attributions after success.
differences in task difficulty attributions were observed.

No gender
Nicholls

(1975) concludes that boys in general adopt defensive attributions
when they fail (attributions to bad luck), while girls adopt selfderogatory attributions when they fail (attributions to lack of
ability).

Nicholls stated:

11

One might also express concern over boys' defensive attributional bias. However, even if this defensiveness made for
less rather than more positive achievement behavior, its
implications would appear to be less serious than the bias
found for girls. Girls' bias was evident for the stable
personal dimension of ability, while boys' bias occurred only
for the external factor of luck. (Nicholls, 1975, p. 388)
Halperin and Abrams (1978) had male and female college students
rate the influence that ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck
had on mid-term exam performance in an economics course.

For

successful students (exam grades above the median score) males and
females used similar attributions to ability to explain their success.
However, for unsuccessful students (exam grades below the median
score), males tended to explain their outcomes by attributions to a
lack of effort, while females attributed their failures to low
ability or bad luck.

Also, when making predictions for final exam

grades, males attributed low anticipated performance on task difficulty, while females tended to blame low ability for predicted poor
performance.
Deaux and Farris (1977) reported similar results.

They

elicited attributions for successful or unsuccessful anagram performance from male and female college students.

Results showed

that men attributed their performance to ability more than females
did, while females tended to use luck to explain their performance.
Also, these differences were stronger in response to failure as
opposed to success, and on masculine as opposed to feminine-typed
tasks.
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Breen, Vulcano and Dyck (1979) reported the results of an
experiment in which males and females were exposed to insoluble or
soluble anagrams in a helplessness induction procedure.

One finding

of interest was that females tended to externalize their attributions for success and internalize their attributions for failure.
Male subjects did not demonstrate this pattern.
Rosenfield and Stephan (1978) contend that males make more
egotistical attributions than females.

They also postulated that

this difference is mediated by sex differences in the degree of egoinvol vement in the task and in how well subjects expected to do on
the task.

To test these assertions, these authors had male and

female college students participate in a geometric design matching
task which was presented as either a masculine or a feminine task.
False success or failure feedback was given to subjects who then
completed an attribution questionnaire.

Results indicated that males

made more internal attributions for success and more external attributions for failure on the masculine task than did females.

How-

ever, on the feminine task, females attributed success more to
internal factors and failure to external factors than did the males.
These results, plus results of a further analysis of covariance,
led Rosenfield and Stephan to conclude that sex differences in attribution were mediated primarily by differences between males and
females in their respective degrees of ego-involvement in the task.
In addition, although the stable-unstable dimension was not of
interest to these authors, analysis of reported means shows that
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females tended to attribute failure to more stable factors (ability
and task difficulty) and success to more unstable factors (effort
and luck) than did males.

This effect seemed to be more pronounced

for failure on the masculine task and for success on the feminine
task.
Studies which assess attributions made by observers concerning
the performance of others also demonstrate gender differences.
Deaux and Emswiller (1974) had male and female subjects evaluate
the performance of either a male or female stimulus person who was
presented as being moderately successful on either a male or femalerelated task.

Results indicated that, for the male-related task,

male success was attributed primarily to skill, while female success
was attributed to chance.

Also, there were no significant differ-

ences between attributions made by female and male subjects.

On the

female-related task, ratings of skill versus luck were equivalent
for male and female stimulus persons.

Results also confirmed the

tendency for female subjects to anticipate poorer performance than
male subjects should they attempt the sample tasks themselves.
Feldman-Summers and Kiesler (1974) had male and female subjects
rate the causes for identical success or failure of male or female
stimulus figures.

Results indicated that subjects attributed greater

motivation to successful females than to successful males.

In

addition, when the stimulus person was presented as a successful
female physician, male subjects attributed her success more to the
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ease of the task than to other factors.

Female subjects perceived

her as having greater motivation and a harder task than a similarly
successful male physician.

These results imply that stable attribu-

tions such as high ability are used to explain success in males,
while unstable factors such as motivation or effort are used to explain female success in identical tasks.

This implies that females

are viewed as having to try harder to succeed in order to overcome
the handicap of lower ability.
Feather and Simon (1975) had observer subjects rate the causal
factors responsible for the success or failure of male and female
actors presented as members of sex-linked occupations.

Results

indicated that subjects in general tended to view ability as a more
important cause of male success than of female success.

Conversely,

lack of ability was viewed as a more important cause of female failure than of male failure.

In addition, with regard to the sex

linkage of occupations, Feather and Simon (1975) stated:
When the female character succeeded at medicine, subjects
were more likely to explain her success in terms of an
easy course of studies, whereas an easy task was seen as a
less important cause when the male character succeeded at
medicine. (p. 26)
These results again imply that people view female success as caused
by external and unstable factors, while female failure is caused
by internal and stable factors.
In a related area, literature on the "self-serving biases" in
causal attribution suggests that normal subjects adopt causal attributions which reflect a motivational tendency toward self-enhancement
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following success and toward self-protection following failure
(e.g., Luginbuhl, Crowe, & Kahan, 1975; Miller, 1976; Sobel, 1974;
Stevens & Jones, 1976).

In effect, these studies suggest that

normal subjects protect their self-esteem by externalizing failure
and enhance their self-esteem by internalizing success.

In a com-

prehensive review of these and other attributional studies, Zuckerman (1979) concluded that gender differences are also found in selfserving biases.

He states that "Overall, it appears that females

tend to make less self-serving attributions, and that this difference
is either greater for masculine tasks or obtained only for masculine
tasks (p. 264) • "

Seen in these terms, the depressive attributional

style proposed by Seligman et al. (1979) represents a relative lack
of self-serving attributional bias in depressed subjects.
In a test of this assertion, Kuiper (1978) separated female
college students into depressed and nondepressed groups on the basis
of their scores on the Costello-Comfrey Depression Scale.

He then

manipulated reinforcement levels for subjects as they participated
in a bogus word association task.

These levels were manipulated so

that subjects would clearly perceive their performance as failure
(20% "correct").
was effective.

A subsequent check revealed that this manipulation
An attribution measure was then administered to

assess subjects' judgments concerning the contribution of ability,
task difficulty, effort or luck to their experienced outcomes.
Kuiper found that depressives who failed tended to make internal
attributions, while failing nondepressives made external attributions.
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However, the prediction that depressives would make more stable
attributions than nondepressives for failure was not upheld.
In light of Kuiper's (1978) negative findings concerning the
stability of attributions made by depressed females for failure,
and the positive finding of Rosenfield and Stephan (1978) that females tended to attribute failure to more stable factors, an important theoretical point needs to be considered.

Most of the studies

reviewed so far have used the ability, effort, task difficulty and
luck distinctions to define the dimensions of causal attributions.
These distinctions have customarily been used to classify causal
factors along two dimensions:

internal-external and stable-unstable.

The resulting 2 by 2 matrix classifies ability as an internal and
stable factor, effort as internal and unstable, task difficulty as
external and stable and luck as external and unstable.

However, as

pointed out by Seligman et al. (1978, Note 4), this scheme does not
hold up.

Actually, ability, effort, task difficulty and luck do not

map directly onto orthogonal combinations of internality and stability.

For example, effort is not necessarily an unstable factor.

An internal and stable attribution may be made to high or low abil-

ity, but may also be made to chronic laziness or consistent hard
work.

As pointed out by Zuckerman (1979), task difficulty may also

be seen as an unstable factor by subjects with no prior experience
with an experimental task.

For these reasons, research using this

2 by 2 matrix to classify attributions cannot lead to strong inferences about the actual stability of effort and task difficulty
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attributions.

Because stability (and also globality) dimensions of

attribution are of central importance in the depressive attributional
style hypothesis, the present study will employ instruments which
assess subject's specific judgments of internality, stability and
globality of chosen attributions.

This strategy is preferable to

trying to draw inferences about attribution dimensions from the
customary four-dimension list.

It is hoped that this strategy might

help clear up some of the conflicting results already mentioned.
It is now possible to more explicitly state the hypotheses of
the first segment of the present study.

College student subjects

were asked to complete the Scale of Attributional Style and the Beck
Depression Inventory (Long Form).
were performed on these data.

Two multiple regression analyses

In the first analysis, gender and

the various attributional ratings from the SAS served as the independent predictor variables of the level of depression as measured
by the BDI.

It was predicted that gender is a meaningful predictor

of level of depression.

More specifically, it was predicted that the

multiple regression coefficient associated with the gender variable
is significantly greater than zero, and that this variable accounts
for a significant proportion of the variance in BDI scores.

It was

then determined which attributional variables, when added to the
prediction equation along with gender, most meaningfully account for
the variance in BDI scores.

It was predicted that the coefficients

associated with the internality, stability and globality of good
outcomes are significantly different from zero in the negative
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direction, while the coefficients associated with the internality,
stability and globality of bad outcomes are significantly different
from zero in the positive direction.

These variables were further

investigated in a second multiple regression equation in which
gender was the dependent variable.

It was expected that the coef-

ficients associated with internality, stability and globality of good
outcomes are significantly negative while the coefficients for
internality, stability and globality of bad outcomes are significantly positive, given that female gender is arbitrarily assigned a
higher value as a variable than male gender.

In other words, fe-

males should demonstrate a greater tendency than males toward the
depressive attributional style.
Hypothetical Versus Real Attributions
The second major focus of the present investigation concerns
the nature of the attributional process itself.
(~.g.,

Several studies

Blaney, Behar & Head, 1980; Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978;

Seligman et al., 1979) have shown that subjects do indeed endorse
various causal attributions or dimensions of attribution when asked
to do so.

However, most of the studies which document differences

in attribution between depressives and nondepressives for their
failure or success have sought attributions for hypothetical events
of varying subjective importance or for events involving false or
manipulated performance feedback.

As Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980)

comment, "Only Barthe and Hammen (in press) have reported an attributional analysis of relatively depressed and nondepressed students'
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responses to actual examination success and failure (p. 662)."
Obviously, there is a need for more studies which seek to investigate attributional patterns when causal explanations are sought for
real-life events.

Subjects in the present study will be asked to

complete an attributional questionnaire closely following the form
of the hypothetical SAS after discovering their grades on their first
examination in introductory psychology.
This strategy has the advantage of allowing comparisons to be
made between attributions made to hypothetical and to real-life
events.

It is possible that there are significant differences

between these two types of attribution.

The literature concerning

this issue is relatively sparse, but there may be reason to suspect
that attributions for real events do not reflect the same attributional patterns reported by Seligman et al. (1979) on the hypothetical SAS.

Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) discuss a study reported by

Harmnen, Krantz and Cochran (1978) in which the authors sought attributions for a variety of real events such as losses and failures.

~ey report that depressed mood is often associated with feelings
of uncontrollability, globality and external locus of control.

This

finding runs counter to the depressive attributional style hypothesis
that states that depressives distort attributions for failure toward
an internal locu~
Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) had depressed and nondepressed
outpatients complete a BDI, a Life Events Inventory and an attributional questionnaire concerned with the five most stressful events
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mentioned in the Life Events Inventory.

This questionnaire sought

information about the internality, stability and globality of causes
mentioned, as well as their controllability, intentionality and
expectancy.

These investigators found that depressed subjects

attributed the cause of the most upsetting event to internal, stable
and global factors.

However, no general differences between depressed

and nondepressed subjects were found when all five events were
compared.

In addition, they found that subjects' questionnaire

ratings of causal dimensions showed a reasonable correspondence with
experimenter-rated causal explanations for stressful events elicited
in the subjects' intake interviews.

These results suggest that the

patterns of attributions may be validly measured through questionnaires.

However, the patterns may be quite variable among depressed

subjects depending on the population, the nature of events under
study and subjects' cognitions about the consequences of events.
In an earlier study (Yount, Note 1), the present author reexamined the results of the Seligman et al. (1979) study.

To do so,

an overall attributional style score was computed for subjects' SAS
ratings.

This score was computed as the ratio of summed ratings

(Internality + Stability + Globality) for bad outcomes over composite
ratings for good outcomes.

Computed in this way, a score of 1.00

represents equal ratings of causes chosen for good and bad outcomes.
Scores greater than 1.00 represent the extent of attributional distortion toward internal, stable and global causes for bad outcomes.
When this computation was applied to means reported by Seligman et
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al. (1979), the results were quite interesting.

The most depressed

subjects (upper quartile of the sample, BDI Short Form scores >6)
showed an overall attributional style score of 0.98.

The least

depressed subjects (lower quartile of the sample, BDI scores <l)
showed an overall score of 0.78.

It is clear that the two groups

differ in the extent of attributional bias shown.

However, it is

also clear that even the most depressed subjects in the sample do not
exhibit a particularly insidious attributional bias toward internal,
stable and global attributions for bad outcomes.

One would expect

this group to show overall scores significantly greater than 1.00.
This analysis implies that the truly distorted attributions for bad
outcomes postulated as the depressive attributional style are not as
salient as expected.

It is possible that this lack of a convincing

demonstration of real depressive attributional style is a function
of the hypothetical nature of the outcomes presented on the SAS.

It

might be hypothesized that the depressive attributional style might
be more identifiable when attributions are sought for real-life
events.

Certainly, real events have a much greater potential for

ego-involvement than hypothetical events, and subjects' affective
reactions are apt to be stronger.
It is also possible that a different pattern of the three
attributional dimensions is more closely associated with depression,
as was found in the Hanunen et al. (1978) study discussed earlier.
Also, the literature on defensive or self-serving biases in attribution does not always demonstrate consistent patterns of defensive
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Bradley (1978) and Zuckerman (1979) both point out that

distortion.

subjects may engage in counter-defensive attributions which do not
fit the hypothesized self-serving pattern.

This tendency appears

to be especially salient in experiments involving interpersonal
influence, or the subjects' anticipation of future evaluation.

In

these situations, nondepressed subjects may still internalize blame
for negative events in order to avoid hurting another subject's
feelings or to attempt to influence future evaluations.

These points

serve to complicate the potential patterns of attribution that may
be demonstrated by subjects.

These difficulties, along with possible

real versus hypothetical differences make it imperative to attempt
to discover what pattern(s) are actually most closely associated
with moderate depression.
Another possible complication is introduced by Blaney, Behar
and Head (1980).

These authors administered the BDI (Short or Long

Form), Krantz and Hammen's Cognitive Bias Questionnaire and Seligman's SAS to two different samples of college students.

As was men-

tioned previously in this review, the perceived importance of the
task, or the extent of ego-involvement may mediate the role of causal
attributions.

To investigate these possible effects, Blaney et al.

(1980) multiplied each attributional rating on the SAS by the corresponding rating of the importance of each hypothetical event.

This

manipulation has the effect of magnifying the presence of attributional bias if it exists, based en the extent of ego-involvement in
the event.

Blaney et al. (1980) report that the use of such weighted
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scores does not increase the strength of association between depression and attribution scores.

Despite these unsupportive results,

the effect of importance weighting of scores bears further investigation.

The question of whether such weighting makes the hypothet-

ical events of the SAS potentially more "realistic" can also be
addressed through comparison of real event attributions and weighted
SAS attributions.
In a narrow sense, the second focus of the present investigation can be construed as a test of the concurrent and construct
validity of Seligman's SAS.

Through comparison with attributions

made by subjects for a real success or failure, the claim that the
SAS reflects a real depressive attributional style can be more
systematically evaluated.

In a broader sense, the possibility of a

disparity between hypothetical and real attributions will be investigated, and its relevance for cognitive theories of depression can
be evaluated.

If, as is contended by Hammen and Krantz (1979), the

moderating effect of attributional variables is more complex than
envisioned by Seligman et al. (1979), this complexity can be further
understood through the results of the present study.
To test these assertions, subjects in the present study were
asked to make causal attributions for their success or failure on
their first psychology examination.

If subjects rated their perfor-

mance as generally poor, their real attributions were compared to
hypothetical SAS attributions for bad outcomes.

Correspondingly,
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subjects who rated their exam performance as generally good were
compared on the basis of their hypothetical SAS attributions for
good outcomes.

A multiple regression format was again employed.

It

was expected that attributions for real events more closely reflect
the depressive attributional style than do attributions for hypothetical events.

More explicitly, attributional variables served

as the independent predictor variables in a multiple regression
equation with BDI scores as the dependent variable.

It was predicted

that multiple regression coefficients associated with attributions
for real outcomes account for significantly more variance in BDI
scores than do coefficients associated with attributions for hypothetical events.
In addition, the relative impact of weighting the attributional
ratings from the SAS as a function of the importance ratings given
each outcome was assessed.

This was done by using weighted attri-

bution ratings as independent variables in the multiple regression
equations generated in the gender analysis as well as the real versus
hypothetical analysis.

It was predicted that the use of the weighted

variables adds significantly to the predictive value of using such
variables to predict BDI scores.

Specifically, it was predicted that

coefficients associated with weighted variables are significantly
larger in the expected directions than coefficients associated with
unweighted variables.

It should be noted that there should be

substantial variance in importance ratings within and between subjects in both segments of the present study in order for weighting
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attribution variables to contribute substantially more to the predictive value of such variables.

METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were drawn from a pool of undergraduate college
students enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Loyola University of Chicago.

The total subject pool consisted of students

from three separate semesters of the course.

During class time,

approximately four weeks into the semester, students completed a
battery of questionnaires which included the Scale of Attributional
Style (SAS) and the Beck Depression Inventory (Long Form).

Within

a maximum of five days after completing the battery, subjects
received a report of their grades on their first examination.

At

this time, they were asked to complete a separate questionnaire
concerning their attributions for their exam performance.

This

questionnaire was called the SAS-2, and it is described below.
Subjects were selected for the present study from the general
subject pool through the use of a stratified sampling procedure.
The relative proportions of males and females present in the general
subject pool at three levels of BDI score (BDI=0-5, BDI=6-9 and
BDI=lO or above) were first determined.

Subjects were then drawn at

random to correspond to the proportions present at the three levels.
Only subjects with complete SAS responses were included.

This

procedure yielded a total of 266 subjects, including 89 males and
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177 females.

Data from all 266 subjects were used in the analysis

of gender effects.

A breakdown of the number and nature of subjects

present in this sample is presented in Table 1.
Of this total of 266 subjects, 165 subjects from only two of
the semesters had complete data on the SAS-2 questionnaire.
these 165 subjects, 54 were males and 111 were females.

Of

Only data

from these 165 subjects were used in the hypothetical versus real
attribution analysis.
Instrumentation
The Scale of Attributional Style was used to assess hypothetical attributional style.
et al. (1979).

This device was introduced by Seligman

It consists of twelve hypothetical situations evenly

divided into six situations with good outcomes and six situations
with bad outcomes.

For each situation, the subject is asked to write

down a major cause for the outcome described.

The subject is then

asked to rate each cause on three separate seven-point scales which
assess, respectively, the internality, stability, and globality of
the chosen cause.

Higher scale scores indicate ratings of greater

internality, stability, and globality.

In addition, the subject is

asked to rate each situation on a seven-point scale according to how
important the given situation would be if it were to actually happen.
Higher importance ratings correspond to greater importance being
given to that particular event.

Copies of the SAS, including in-

structions given to subjects, are included in Appendix A.
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Table 1
Breakdown of Total Subjects According
to BDI Score Levels and Gender

Males

Females

% Within

BDI Scores

% Within

N

Level

N

Level

Total Per Level

BDI

= 0-5

35

39 .8

53

60.2

88

BDI

= 6-9

25

38.5

40

61.5

65

BDI

= 10+

29

25. 7

84

74.3

113

TOTALS

89

33.5

177

66.5

266
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Psychometric data concerning the SAS form used are discussed
in Note 1 of Seligman et al. (1979).

Reliability coefficient alphas

for the various subscales are reported as follows:
internality
stability

= .64,

=

=

.44, good outcome internality

=

bad outcome

.39, bad outcome

.63, good outcome stability = .58, bad outcome globality

and good outcome globality

= .58.

While these reliabilities

might be considered low, Seligman et al. report robust results for
differences in attributional style between depressed and nondepressed
college students.

In addition, these authors report significant

(p <.001) correlations with the Beck Depression Inventory, Short
Form as follows:

bad outcome internality: r = .41; bad outcome

globality: r = .35; bad outcome stability: r = .34.
are:

Also reported

good outcome internality: r = .22 (p <.01); good outcome sta-

bility: r

=

-.28 (p <.002), and good outcome globality: r = -.04

(non-significant).
Also used was an adaptation of the SAS called here the SAS-2.
Tiiis device was used in order to gather attribution information concerning subjects' causal explanations for their real exam performance.
Two questions were asked concerning 1) the letter grade received by
the subject and 2) his or her subjective evaluation of the grade
received in terms of his or her personal standards.

Tiiis latter

question asked subjects to rate their evaluation on a seven-point
scale from "Excellent" (rating= 7) to "Terrible" (rating= 1).
Subjects were then asked to write down a major cause for their performance, followed by ratings of the internality, stability and
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globality of the chosen cause.

These were seven-point scales which

correspond exactly to the form of the SAS.

Subjects were then

asked to rate the importance of their specific exam performance and
the importance of their general academic performance.

Again, higher

ratings on the SAS-2 correspond to greater internality, stability,
globality,and importance ratings.
in Appendix A.

A copy of the SAS-2 is contained

RESULTS
Gender and Attributional Style
In order to evaluate the stated hypotheses concerning gender
and attributional style, a standard multiple regression analysis
was performed.

In this analysis, BDI scores served as the dependent

variable, and gender and the various attributional dimensions from
the SAS scores served as the independent predictor variables.
Results of this analysis are presented in Tables 2 and 3.

Table 2

presents the results of the overall test of goodness of fit of the
multiple regression equation.

This test evaluates the null hypoth-

esis that the multiple correlation of gender and SAS variables with
BDI scores is zero.

Results indicate that the null hypothesis is

rejected, F(7,258) = 3.04, p <.01, implying that the overall multiple
correlation is significantly different from zero.

This overall

multiple correlation coefficient is equal to 0.276, which, when
squared, implies that the combination of gender and SAS variables
accounts for 7.6% of the total variance in BDI scores.
To evaluate the relative contribution of individual predictor
variables to the variance explained by the total equation, a series
of F tests were then performed.
in Table 3.

Results of these tests are presented

Because the contribution of the gender variable is of

primary interest, initial attention will be focused on the F test
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Table 2
Analysis of Variance Summary for Overall Multiple Regression
Equation with BDI Scores Dependent and Unweighted
Attributional Variables and Gender as Predictors

Source
Multiple
Regression
Equation
Residual

Sum of Squares

Mean

Square

df

1032.49

147.50

7

12524.86

48.55

258

Overall Multiple R = 0.276.

R Square = 0.076

F

3.04

<.01

Table 3
Summary of the Multiple Regression Analysis of Gender and Attributional Variables
with BDI Scores Dependent (Unweighted Attribution Variables)
Variable

~ultiple

R Squared

R

F

(df =-1,258)

E.

Simple R

Positive Outcome
Stability

0.138

0.019

4. 34

<.05

-0.14

Negative Outcome
Globality

0.208

0.043

9.23

<.01

0.12

Negative Outcome
Stability

0.244

0.060

4.61

<.05

-0.08

Gender

0.272

0.074

3.53

<.10

0.11

Normative Outcome
Internality

0.275

0.076

0.47

N.S.

0.07

Positjve Outcome
Internality

0.276

0.076

0.14

N.S.

-0.07

Positive Outcome
Globality

0.276

0.076

0.06

N.S.

-0.03
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for this variable.
F(l,258)

= 3.53,

Results for the gender variable indicate that

p <.10.

statistical significance.

This result approaches, but does not reach,
From Table 3, it can be observed that

the increment in the multiple R squared associated with the gender
variable is 0.014, implying that gender accounts for only 1.4% of
the total variance in BDI scores when the contribution of SAS variables is accounted for.

In addition, an examination of means

reported in Table 4 shows that the mean BDI score for males is 7.99,
while for females it is 9.63.

Standard t-test results show that

this difference is significant, t264 = 1.77, p <.05, one tailed.
These results confirm the hypothesis that females are generally more
depress.ed. However, this difference is apparently not large enough
to make gender a significant predictor of overall variance in BDI
scores.
Another hypothesis tested concerns the usefulness of using
weighted attribution variables as predictors of BDI scores along
with the gender variable.

In the present study, weighted attribu-

tion variables were calculated by multiplying ratings of the internality, stability and globality of chosen causes for each SAS outcome
by the corresponding rating of the importance of each outcome and
then summing these products across the six positive and the six
negative outcome situations.

Descriptive statistics for the resul-

tant weighted variables for males and females are presented in Table

4.

35
Table 4
Sunnnary Statistics for Males vs. Females
on BDI and Attributional (SAS) Scores
Variable
BDI

Males (N=89)
Mean
S.D.

Females (N=l77)
Mean
S.D.

7.99

7.62

9.63

6.86

27.24
32.21
29.67

4.32
4.52
4.54

26.81
33.11
30.37

3.98
5.09
5.40

25. 77
27.98
25.16

6. 75
5.63
6.34

26.59
27.66
24.99

5.29
5.68
6.36

147.11
177. 48
164.38

31.94
40.87
39. 72

152.10
189.41
176.24

31. 97
39.65
40. 77

130. 91
143.24
128.81

45.39
42. 71
44.43

143.18
147.88
134.55

36.69
39.90
43.50

UNWEIGHTED VARIABLES
Positive Outcomes
Internality
Stability
Globality
Negative Outcomes
Internality
Stability
Globality
WEIGHTED VARIABLES
Positive Outcomes
Internality
Stability
Globality
Negative Outcomes
Internality
Stability
Globality
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To investigate the impact of using such weighted variables, a
second multiple regression equation analysis was performed, with
gender and weighted SAS variables used as independent predictors with
BDI scores dependent.

Table 5 presents the summary of the test for

goodness of fit for this regression equation, F(6,259)

=

2.93, p <.01,

implying that the overall multiple correlation with weighted SAS
variables is also significantly different from zero.

This multiple

regression equation generated an overall multiple coefficient of
0.252, which implies that the use of weighted variables along with
gender accounts for 6.4% of the total variance in BDI scores.

Since

the use of unweighted variables accounts for 7.6% of the variance in
BDI scores, it can be concluded that the use of weighted variables
does not add significantly to the predictive power of attribution
variables.
Another hypothesis to be evaluated concerns the attribution
variables which significantly account for variance in BDI scores.
Results for unweighted variables are presented in Table 3.

In addi-

tion to gender, three attribution variables have multiple regression
coefficients significantly different from zero:
stability, F(l,258)

= 4.34,

Positive outcome

p <.05, Negative outcome globality,

F(l,258) = 9.23, p <.01 and Negative outcome stability, F(l,258)
4.61, p <.05.

Results of F tests for other attribution variables are

not significant.

The signs and magnitudes of the simple regression

coefficients associated with the significant variables are as
follows:

=

Positive outcome stability simple r = -0.14, Negative
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance Summary for Overall Multiple Regression
Equation with BDI Scores Dependent, and Weighted
Attributional Variables and Gender as Predictors

Source
Multiple Regression
Equation
Residual

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

863. 31

6

143.88

12694.03

259

49.01

F

2.93

.E.
<.01
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outcome globality simple r = +o.12 and Negative outcome stability
simple r = -0.08.

These results imply that Positive outcome sta-

bility and Negative outcome stability ratings decrease as BDI scores
increase.

Negative outcome globality ratings increase as BDI scores

increase.

These results confirm the hypotheses of the present study

for Positive outcome stability and Negative outcome globality
because the relationship with BDI scores is significant and in the
expected direction.

Results for Negative outcome stability ratings

are in the opposite direction than that hypothesized.
Results of a similar multiple regression analysis using
weighted SAS variables are summarized in Table 6.

With weighted

variables, only the relationship between Negative outcome globality
and BDI scores is significant and in the expected direction, F(l,
258) = 8.70, p <.01, simpler= +o.13.
In order to further probe the relationship between gender and
attributional variables, further multiple regression analyses were
performed with gender as the dependent variable and both weighted
and unweighted SAS variables as independent predictors.

Results of

the analysis for unweighted variables are summarized in Table 7.
Results indicate that it cannot be stated that there is a significant
non-zero overall multiple regression coefficient, F(6,259)
n.s.

= 1.45,

Results of a similar analysis using weighted SAS variables as

independent predictors are summarized in Tables 8 and 9.

These

results imply that the overall multiple regression coefficient of
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Table 6
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis of Gender
and Attributional Variables as Predictors with BDI
Scores Dependent (Weighted Attribution Variables)

Variable

Multiple R R Squared

F

(df=f:-258)

.E.

Simple R

Negative Outcome
Globality

0.126

0.016

8.70

<.01

0.13

Negative Outcome
Stability

0.195

0.038

4.76

<.05

0.00

0.220

0.049

2.90

<.10

0.11

Positive Outcome
Stability

0.237

0.056

2.17

N.S.

-0.05

Negative Outcome
Intemality

0.248

0.062

1.23

N.S.

0.11

Positive Outcome
Internality

0.252

0.064

0.54

N .S.

-0.01

Gender
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Table 7
Analysis of Variance Summary for Overall Multiple Regression
Analysis with Gender Dependent and Attributional Variables
as Predictors (Unweighted Attribution Variables)

Source
Multiple Regression
Equation
Residual

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean Square

1.927

6

0.321

57.295

259

0.221

F

1.45

(N .S.)
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Table 8
Analysis of Variance Summary for Overall Multiple Regression
Analysis with Gender Dependent and Weighted
Attributional Variables as Predictors

Source
Multiple Regression
Equation
Residual

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean Square

2.814

6

0.469

56.408

259

0.218

F

2.15

.E.

<.05
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Table 9
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis of
Weighted Attributional Variables with Gender Dependent

Variable

Multiple R R Squared

Simple R

F

(df=l, 259)
Negative Outcome
Internality

0.144

0.021

6.45

<.05

0.144

Positive Outcome
Globality

0.184

0.034

1.09

N.S.

0.138

Negative Outcome
Stability

0.197

0.039

0.96

N.S.

0.054

Positive Outcome
Stability

0.206

0.042

1. 70

N.S.

0.140

Positive Outcome
Internality

0.216

0.047

1.31

N. S.

0.074

Negative Outcome
Globality

0.218

0.048

0.24

N.S.

0.062
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0.218 is significantly different from zero, and accounts for 4.8%
of the total variance in gender.

When the impact of the individual

weighted SAS predictor variables is assessed (Table 9), only Negative outcome internality, F(l,259)

= 6.45,

p <.05, simple r

proves to be significantly related to gender.

= +o.14,

Because female gender

was arbitrarily assigned a higher variable value than male gender,
this result implies that weighted Negative outcome internality
ratings are higher for females than for males.
in the expected direction.

This relationship is

All other weighted and unweighted SAS

variables cannot be said to be significantly related to gender.
To summarize these rather complicated and varied results, it
can be said that the general hypothesis concerning the relation
between gender and depression is supported only by statistical trends.
The use of weighted SAS variables does not appear to add to the
predictive value of such variables.

The only unweighted SAS var-

iables which relate significantly to depression in the expected
direction are Positive outcome stability and Negative outcome globality, while Negative outcome stability relates to depression in the
opposite direction than was expected.

The only weighted SAS variable

significantly related to depression in the expected direction is
Negative outcome globality.

The only SAS variable which relates

significantly to gender in the expected direction is weighted
Negative outcome internality.
Real Versus Hypothetical Attributions

As mentioned previously, a subset of 165 out of the 266 total
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subjects was used to analyze possible differences between real and
hypothetical outcome attributions.

Subjects were assigned to either

a positive outcome or a negative outcome group based on their SAS-2
responses concerning their subjective evaluation of their exam performance.

Subjects evaluating their exam performance as "Terrible"

to "Poor" (Ratings = 1 to 3, respectively) were assigned to the
negative outcome group.

Their ratings of internality, stability

and globality of causes chosen for exam performance were designated
as attribution ratings for a negative real outcome in order to be
compared to their hypothetical outcome ratings for negative outcomes.
Subjects evaluating their exam performance as "Fair" to "Excellent"
(Ratings= 4 to 7, respectively) were designated as experiencing a
positive outcome, and SAS-2 ratings were only compared with SAS
ratings of causes chosen for hypothetical positive outcomes.

Summary

statistics for these positive and negative groups are presented in
Table 10.
In order to analyze possible differences between hypothetical
and real outcome attributions, a series of hierarchical multiple
regression equations were generated.

This type of multiple regres-

sion analysis differs from the type used in the first section of the
present study in that variables are now added into the equations in
a specified order.

This strategy allows F tests to be performed to

determine if either of the hypothetical or real attribution variable
groups (internality+stability+globality ratings) contributes significantly more to the explained variance in BDI scores when added last
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Table 10
Summary Statistics for Real and Hypothetical Attribution Variables
for Subjects Experiencing Positive or Negative Exam Outcomes

EXAM
Outcome
Positive (N=96)
Mean
S.D.

Negative (N=69)
S.D.
Mean

5.04

1.07

2.04

0.92

Internality

4.54

0.60

4.43

1.02

Stability

5.59

0.69

4.46

1.07

Globality

5.19

o. 77

4.03

1.29

Internality

5. 71

1.35

5.61

1.65

Stability

5.69

1.33

4. 75

1.98

Globality

4.53

1.89

3. 77

1. 78

Subjective
Evaluation
Hypothetical
Attributions (SAS)

Real Outcome
Attributions (SAS-2)
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to the equation.

It should be noted that since a subject's subjec-

tive evaluation of his or her exam performance may be confounded by
the presence or absence of depression, the subjective evaluation
variable is allowed to enter the multiple regression equation first.
This strategy in effect allows the proportion of explained variance
in BDI scores attributable to this confounded variable to be removed
from the consideration of the relative explanatory power of hypothetical and real attribution variables.
Results of the F tests applied to the proportions of explained
variance attributable to hypothetical of real outcome attributions
are summarized in Table 11.

As

can be observed, none of these F

tests reaches significance.

These results imply that neither real

nor hypothetical outcome attributions add significantly more to the
explained variance than the other when added last to the hierarchical equation.

Thus, the hypothesis concerning the supposed predom-

inance of real outcome attributions in accounting for level of
depression was not confirmed.

This effect is most likely the result

of the relatively weak predictive value of all attribution variables,
since the multiple Regression coefficient R equals only 0.27 for
negative outcome subjects and only 0.26 for the positive outcome
group.

This means that only 7.1% of the variance in BDI scores is

explained by all the variables considered.

Inferences concerning

the relative contribution of variable subsets to this relatively
small proportion of explained variance must, of necessity, be quite
tentative.
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Table 11
Summary of F Tests When Hypothetical or Real Attribution
Variables Are Added Last In a Hierarchical Multiple
Regression Analysis (N

= 165)(BDI

Scores Dependent)

Negative Exam Outcome
Total R
Squared Change

(df=3,157)
F

£.

Subjective Evaluation

.022

--*

--*

Real Attributions

.011

0.67

N.S •

Hypothetical Attributions

• 035

2.00

N.S.

Total R
Squared Change

(df=3, 157)

Variable

Multiple R = 0.27

R2 = 0.071

Positive Exam Outcome
Variable

F

E.

Subjective Evaluation

.022

Real Attributions

. 019

0.67

N.S •

Hypothetical Attributions

. 027

1. 78

N.S .

Multiple R = 0.26

*Note:

R2 = 0.071

See text for explanation of F-test procedures
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Also evaluated were hypotheses concerning the effects of
weighting real outcome attribution variables by multiplying attribution ratings by the importance ratings elicited by the SAS-2.
However, there was very little variance in importance ratings across
subjects.

For positive outcome subjects, the mean importance rating

for exam performance was 6.33 (out of a possible 7 as "Extremely
Important"), with variance equal to 0.58.

For negative outcome

subjects, the mean was also 6.33, with variance of 1.37.

Since the

variance of real outcome importance ratings is so small, the effects
of weighting real outcome attribution variables are not likely to
produce significant differences from the use of unweighted variables.
For this reason, the hypothesis that weighting real outcome attribution variables might increase their explanatory power was not
confirmed.

DISCUSSION
The basic premise surrounding the hypotheses generated in the
first major segment of this study is that gender differences in the
incidence and extent of depression can be accounted for by differences between males and females in their causal attributions.

Al-

though results do indicate a significant difference in depression
scores between males and females in the expected direction, the
basic hypothesis is supported only by statistical trends and mixed
results.

In general, significant differences in attributional style

were not found between males and females, except in a few rather
specific cases.

Indeed, the combination of attribution variables

and the gender variable used as predictors of BDI scores only
accounts for 7.6% of the total variance in BDI scores.

It is obvious

that factors not measured in the present study are responsible for
a large portion of the variance in depression scores between subjects.
It must also be concluded that, at least for the present sample,
differences in causal attribution do not strongly account for differences in the degree of depression.
However, in the context of these generally weak relationships
between gender, attributional style and depression, some relatively
minor trends found in the data may provide footholds for speculation
and further inquiry.

For example, in the overall regression equation

with BDI scores dependent, three unweighted SAS attribution variables
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(
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account for small but statistically significant portions of total
BDI variance.

Both positive outcome stability and negative outcome

stability ratings correlate significantly with BDI scores in the
negative direction, implying that such ratings decrease as BDI scores
increase.

In terms of the actual wording of the SAS stability ques-

tions, this result means that the more depressed subjects believed
that the causes chosen for both positive and negative outcomes
would, relatively, not influence the outcome of similar situations.
Seligman's reformulation of learned helplessness predicts that the
more depressed subjects tend to view the causes of positive outcomes
as unstable, which translates into an expectation that the causes of
positive outcomes will not operate in similar situations in the
future.

The results of the present study tend to confirm this

assertion.
However, Seligman's theory does not predict that the more depressed subjects will also rate the causes of negative outcomes as
relatively unstable.

According to the reformulation, the more de-

pressed subjects should believe that the causes of bad outcomes will
also influence the bad outcomes of similar situations in the future.
The depressed subjects in the present study appear to believe more
strongly than the nondepressed subjects that causes chosen for bad
outcomes are not as likely to operate in the future, a result which
conflicts with the reformulation.
There are several possible interpretations of this result.
is possible that the general belief in the instability of causes

It
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represents a roore general pessimism on the part of depressed subjects.

However, this pessimism may not represent the simple expec-

tation that future events will have bad outcomes.

Rather, this

pessimism may be of a more specific and subtle type.

It must be

remembered that the context of subjects' attribution ratings pertains
to causes for certain outcomes.

Seen in this way, the instability

of causes for positive or negative outcomes may represent the belief
that each new situation is unique, and that each new situation has
its own unique pattern of causes.

It is as if the depressed subject

is saying, "I can't be sure that any causal explanation of my present
outcomes will apply in the future."
events are unpredictable.

This posture implies that future

Seen in this way, the depressive subject

is in a chronic state of doubt about the outcome of future events.
He or she shys away from making any sort of prediction because the
causes of past events, either positive or negative, are seen as
unstable.

It is true that this doubt might be transformed into the

hope that causes for negative events will not operate in the future.
However, this rather tentative hopefulness occurs along with the
belief that causes for past positive events will not operate in the
future either.

The distinction here is between a pessimism of causes

as opposed to a pessimism of events.
This distinction may be extended as a possible explanation of
the difference in the nature of the pessimism expressed by the more
seriously depressed person as opposed to that expressed by the person
who is only mildly depressed.

It seems likely that the seriously
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depressed person is more pessimistic about events.
things to turn out badly in the future.

He or she expects

The less seriously depressed

person, on the other hand, may have a chronic pessimism about causes.
He or she may not feel that the future is necessarily bleak, but
merely that the future is unpredictable.

Positive events might take

place, but the causes for past positive events may not apply.

In

clinical training, the present author has encountered a number of
mildly depressed older adolescents.

These people often communicate

the attitude that the world is a generally uncertain place.

They

find it difficult to make positive or negative statements about
specific events in the future because they are not sure that the
causes of past good or bad outcomes will again operate.
to lack a stable basis for prediction.

They appear

The subjects in the present

study seem to exhibit a tendency toward this same pessimism of
causes.
It may be possible to reconcile this concept with some of the
more basic ideas proposed by Seligman's reformulation.

In the

Abramson et al. (1978) article, a causal sequence leading to the
symptoms of helplessness depressions is proposed.

In this sequence,

people perceive a noncontingency between responses and outcomes in
the present and past, and make attributions for this noncontingency.
These attributions, in turn, lead to the expectation of future noncontingency.

This concept of the expectation of future noncontingency

is quite similar to what is being called here the pessimism of causes.
The lack of any predictable relationship between responses and
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outcomes in the future can take place in the context of unstable
causes.

When the person is uncertain about the causes of past and

present outcomes, he or she cannot be sure that certain responses
will be reliably followed by certain outcomes in the future.

It is,

of course, possible that this uncertainty is greater when the person
assumes that there are external causes than it would be if internal
causes are blamed.

However, even internal attributions for outcomes

can•contribute to uncertainty about the future if these attributions
are also seen as unstable.

It is also still possible that internal

and stable attributions for past negative outcomes will lead to the
expectation of future negative outcomes.

However, it is proposed

that this latter attributional pattern is more characteristic of the
pessimism of events associated with more severe depression.

The

pessimism of causes may be associated more with moderate depression.
It is proposed that moderate depression may be associated with a
greater variety of attributional patterns than is proposed by Seligman's reformulation.

Given this new point of view, the instability

of causes becomes an important factor in producing mild depression,
regardless of the internal-external dimension or the positive or
negative nature of the experienced outcome.
This speculation is supported by the discussion presented by
Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980).

They state:

. • • it is time for more differentiated and elaborated models
of depression and cognition. The present study, as well as the
recent ones noted, suggests that different patterns of attributions may be associated with depression, depending on the
population sampled or the nature of the events studied. . •
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Depression may be most likely to occur when the coping or selfefficacy perceptions are most bleak for the individual, but
such perceptions may not always be directly predictable from
knowledge of causal attributions. • • • Our studies lead to
tentative conclusions that there are various cognitive pathways
to depression •
(pp. 667-668)
It is proposed that the bleakness of coping or self-efficacy perceptions can be greatly exacerbated by the instability of causes for
both positive and negative outcomes.
The other attribution variable which tended to be associated
with greater depression in the present study was unweighted negative
outcome globality.

This variable correlated positively with BDI

scores, implying that the globality of causes chosen for bad outcomes
increases as depression increases.

In more basic terms, depressed

subjects seem to believe that causes for particular negative events
will also influence other events in their lives.

This result is

consistent with the results presented by Blaney et al. (1980), who
found the correlation between SAS unweighted bad outcome globality
and BDI scores to be the most robust of all the attribution-depression
score correlations.

When combined with the present study's findings

of a general instability of causes for both positive and negative
outcomes, bad outcome globality takes on a special meaning.

While

depressed subjects cannot be sure that causes for certain events will
operate in similar situations in the future, they appear to be more
certain that the causes of negative events will influence other
areas of their lives in the future.

The person who says that he or

she failed at a task because he or she is generally lazy may not be
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be certain that laziness will influence that task in the future.
However, he or she can be more certain that laziness will crop up
during other types of tasks.

In this way, the pessimism of causes

may be somewhat relieved, but uncertainty is reduced only through
the assumption that other areas of life may fall prey to globally
negative factors.

While uncertainty is reduced, depression and

general pessimism can only be increased through such a combination
of causal assumptions.

This more interactional approach to the re-

lationship between causal attributions obviously makes this relationship a great deal more complicated than the Seligman reformulation
would suggest.
Since this more complicated relationship is suggested by
trends found in the present study, a further theoretical and methodological point must be considered.
II

As stated by Blaney et al. (1980),

it is clear that internality, stability and globality may in-

teract with one another in important ways not captured by considering
them one at a time or in a simple sum" (p. 682).

And, as pointed

out by Huesmann (1978), "Any reformulated model of depression should
include a more careful delineation of the types of depression being
explained" (p. 195).

Given these two points of view, the results of

the present study suggest that an unspecified number of attributional
patterns could be associated with different types and levels of
depression.

If this were true, the lack of a statistically strong

relationship between a single hypothesized pattern of attributions
arrd relatively moderate reported depression in college students in
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the present study is not too surprising.

The design and analyses

used in the present study are admittedly not precise or comprehensive
enough to account for BDI score variance which may result from more
complicated interactions of attributional dimensions.

Future research

should incorporate more precise hypotheses and design techniques to
test for ltDre varied attributional patterns.
The results of the analysis of gender effects and attributional
style do not generally confirm the hypotheses of the present study.
In the context of the above discussion, there is no reason to believe that separating gender effects would lead to any further simplification of the attributional model.

If complicated interactions

can take place between attributional dimensions to produce depression,
the results of the present study suggest that such interactions
could take place in males as well as females.

In addition, the

general differences in attributional style between males and females
reported in previous studies do not appear in the results of the
present study, with the exception of one special case to be considered
shortly.

Two major factors might account for this lack of significant

differences between males and females.
The first of these possible factors is advanced tentatively,
and is obviously in need of further investigation.

It is possible,

however, that attributional patterns demonstrated by females in the
past studies have changed in the ensuing years.

It is possible that

today's female college students have shifted away from the depressive
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attributional style toward a style which is more self-serving.

In

terms of attributions made for bad outcomes, the present sample of
females may adopt less internal, stable and global attributions than
previous samples.

We may be observing the cognitive results of some

fairly significant changes in the definition of women's roles in
society and in the factors to which they attribute their successes
and failures in a wide variety of tasks.
As Deaux and Farris (1977) have observed, "most of the signi-

ficant differences between men and women occur on the masculine
task. • •

Differences between men and women also seem more apparent

in the case of failure as opposed to success" (p. 69).

It is possible

that the distinction between "masculine" and "feminine" tasks has
blurred considerably, especially in younger college-age populations.
When the types of situations presented in the SAS are considered in
this light, none of them can be clearly labeled as masculine or feminine tasks.

It is not surprising, then, to find that attributions

elicited from the SAS do not differ substantially between males and
females.

Further research might possibly substantiate these tenta-

tive claims by comparing women of different ages, and also by comparing college-student females with females of the same age in the
general population.
The second major factor to be considered also has to do with
the nature of the tasks presented on the SAS.
separated into two distinct types:
achievement situations.

These tasks can be

affiliation situations and

Most of the studies considered in the review
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of the literature for this study demonstrated male and female differences in attributions for achievement-type tasks.

In a previous

study by the present author (Yount, Note 1), it was found that subjects with nondepressive attributional styles for affiliation outcomes
became more elated following a success than did those subjects with
depressive affiliation outcome styles.

This difference was not

demonstrated for styles associated with achievement-type outcomes.
In the light of these differing results for the two types of outcomes,
it is possible that actual male and female differences are confounded
in the present sample.

Actual differences between males and females

on one type of task may have been cancelled out by differences in
the opposite direction on the other type of task.

For example, the

depressive attributional style may be more salient for females than
for males on achievement tasks, consistent with previous results.
However, the depressive style may be more salient in males on affiliation tasks.

Thus, what appears to be an equivalence between males

and females in the present sample may actually represent opposing
differences based on the type of task involved.

Future attempts to

demonstrate attributional differences with the SAS should take this
point into consideration.
One potentially meaningful difference between the attributions
made by males and females was found.

When weighted SAS variables

were used as predictors with gender dependent, negative outcome
internality was found to account for a small but statistically significant portion of the variance in gender.

The direction of this
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relationship implies that females adopted more internal attributions
for bad outcomes than did males, a result which confirms the stated
hypothesis.
internality.

However, this is true for weighted attributions of
It must be remembered that weighted ratings were ob-

tained by multiplying attribution ratings for a particular outcome
by the importance rating for that outcome for each subject.

Since

negative outcome internality ratings did not differ between males
and females for unweighted ratings, some aspect of the weighting
process is implicated.

To have produced this difference, it is most

likely that females rated situations with negative outcomes as being
more important than did males.

Further statistical probing of this

interaction between importance, outcome and gender is not possible
given the present design, so we can only speculate about the source
of the difference.

It is possible that this difference may represent

a greater sensitivity to failure among females in the sample.

Given

the pressures in today's society for females to demonstrate competence in situations and roles previously considered the province of
males, it is not surprising that females might place more importance
on failure.

Becoming ego-involved in difficult situations with the

potential for failure may represent an adaptive way to better one's
performance on such tasks.

However, consistent with the hypotheses

of this study, overemphasizing the importance of situations with a
negative outcome may also be potentially depressing.
The general lack of significant differences between the predictive power of weighted versus unweighted attributions is consistent
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with the findings of Blaney et al. (1980).

These researchers con-

cluded that " • . • there was no indication that such weighting increased the association with level of depression" (p. 680).

However.

in the light of Rosenfield and Stephan's (1978) contention that egoinvolvement mediates male and female differences in attributions,
these results are somewhat puzzling.

It may be possible that SAS

importance ratings mediate the association between attribution,
gender and depression in a more complicated fashion than a simple
multiplicative manipulation would reveal.

It is also possible that

meaningful differences between weighted and unweighted variables are
washed out through the complicated interactions of outcome and outcome type mentioned previously.

The investigation of such possi-

bilities may be fertile ground for more empirical research on the
mathematical impact of importance ratings as a measure of ego-involvement.
In the second major portion of the present study, possible
differences between attributions made to hypothetical versus real
events were investigated.

Results indicated that real event attri-

butions are not significantly better predictors of level of depression
than hypothetical event attributions.

One possible reason for this

lack of differences may be found in a factor already mentioned.
The SAS is divided into achievement and affiliation situations, while
the SAS-2 used here to assess real outcome attributions pertains
strictly to an achievement situation (exam performance).

Perhaps if

SAS-2 responses had been compared only with SAS achievement-related
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outcome responses, the expected differences would have emerged.
Another possible interpretation has also already been touched
on.

Perhaps neither hypothetical E.£E_ real attributions can be so

simply related to the presence of depression.

It is speculated that

the possible relationships among attributions and depression are so
complicated by the possibility of multiple attributional patterns
that the relatively straightforward assessment of attributions with
SAS-type devices, and their analysis with correlational designs just
does not give a full enough picture.

It would not be inconsistent

with the speculations already presented to assume that the same complications which apply to hypothetical attributions might also apply
to real attributions.
One other point needs to be considered also.

The present

design sought to show relationships between attributional patterns
and the presence of depression.
narrow.

This point of view may be too

Perhaps attributional style, either real or hypothetical,

predisposes people to depression.

It is obvious that the BDI seeks

to assess the presence of and not the predisposition to depression.
As

Blaney et al. (1980) put it:

II

. a strong relationship between

cognitive distortion and depression vulnerability would not necessarily result in a strong correlation between distortion and depression"
(p. 682, italics theirs).

Depression, especially mild or moderate

depression is also a generally fluctuating phenomenon.

The possibil-

ity exists that some subjects in the present sample who had

particularly depressive attributional styles did not endorse many
BDI items because they were feeling better on that day.

The cumula-

tive effect would again be to wash out possible significant differences between subjects for both real and hypothetical attributions.
On another level, it is possible that the assessment of attributions with SAS-type questionnaires does not give full credit to
the complexity of the attributional process as a whole.

As Wortman

and Dintzer (1978) mention, the attributional process may more clearly
be viewed as an hypothesis-testing procedure.

In this sense, causal

attributions represent tentative and unstable guesses about causes
which are then tested against future experiences.

Seen in this way,

SAS-type assessments only give us a look at variable stages of a
dynamic process.

This point of view is in some considerable conflict

with the conception of the SAS as a measure of some concrete and
stable feature of a person's cognitive life.

Any research design

which only samples a single temporal slice of fluctuating depression
and ever-changing attributional hypotheses must necessarily be greatly
weakened.
In addition, the process of developing causal attributions
may be influenced by a variety of factors not measured in the present
study.

As

Huesman (1978) implies, a one-time assessment of causal

attributions does not take into account the various informationprocess ing and expectancy judgment strategies engaged in by different
people.

In this sense, we must not only examine the causal attribu-

tions endorsed by subjects, but we must also examine the possible
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distortions of information which can lead to variability in the formation of tentative attributions.
do this.

SAS-type instruments simply cannot

Also, the possibility that the presence of depression may

itself influence the endorsement of attributions cannot be accounted
for by the SAS.
In summary, it can be said that the lack of confirming results
in the present study is most likely the result of taking too narrow
a look at a relatively complicated phenomenon.

The possibility of

multiple attributional patterns associated with depression, as well
as the inadequacies of SAS-type assessment devices used in a correlational design make it difficult to demonstrate meaningful and significant differences in gender and attributional style.

Further re-

search should focus on the attempt to investigate these more complicated phenomena.

Among these phenomena are the possible distinction

between a pessimism of causes as opposed to a pessimism of events,
possible historical changes in gender-specific attribution patterns,
the fluctuating nature of moderate depression, and differences in the
nature of mild versus severe depression.

Also to be investigated

are the more basic aspects of the attribution process itself.

More

precise and testable models, and the use of longitudinal designs in
the context of variable patterns of attribution could go a long way
in further specifying the relationships between cognition, gender,
and depression.
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SCALE OF ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE
DIRECTIONS
Please try to vividly imagine yourself in the situations that
follow. If such a situation happened to you, what would you feel
would have caused it? While events may have many causes, we want
you to pick only one--the major cause if this event happened to you.
Please write this cause in the blank provided after each event.
Next we want you to answer some questions about the cause and a final
question about the situation. To summarize, we want you to:
1) Read each situation and vividly imagine it happening to you.
2) Decide what you feel would be the major cause of this
situation if it happened to you.
3) Write one cause in the blank provided.
4) Answer three questions about the cause.
5) Answer one question about the situation.
6) Go on to the next situation.
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YOU MEET A FRIEND WHO COMPLIMENTS YOU ON YOUR APPEARANCE
1) Write down the ~ major cause --------------------------------2) Is the cause of your friend's compliment due to something about

you or something about the other person or circumstances?
one number)
Totally due
to the other
person or·
circumstances

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

(Circle

Totally due
to me

3) In the future when you are with your friends, will this cause

again influence what happens?
Will never
again influence 1
what happens

2

3

(Circle one number)
4

5

6

7

Will always
influence
what happens

4) Is the cause something that just affects interacting with friends
or does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one
number)
Influences
just this
particular
situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

Influences
7 all situations in my
life

5) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?

(Circle one number)
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Extremely
important

YOU HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR A JOB UNSUCCESSFULLY FOR SOME TIME
6) Write down one major cause

----------------------------------~

7) Is the cause of your unsuccessful job search due to something

about you or something about other people or circumstances?
(Circle one number)
Totally due to
other people
1
or circumstances

2

3

4

5

6

7

Totally due
to me
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8) In the future when looking for a job, will this cause again
influence what happens? (Circle one number)
Will never
again influence
what happens

1

2

3

4

5

6

Will always
7 influence
what happens

9) Is the cause something that just influences looking for a job or

does it also influence other areas of your life?
number)
Influences
just this
particular
situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

(Circle one
Influences
7 all situations in
my life

10) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?
(Circle one number)
Not at all
important

Extremely
1

2

3

4

5

6

7 important

YOU INVEST MONEY IN THE STOCK MARKET AND MAKE A PROFIT
11) Write down the one cause

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

12) Is the cause of your making a profit in the stock market due to
something about you or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)
Totally due
to other people 1
or circumstances

2

3

4

5

6

Totally due
7 to me

13) In the future when investing in the stock market, will this cause
again influence what happens? (Circle one number)
Will never
again influence
what happens

Will always
1

2

3

4

5

6

7 influence

what happens

14) Is the cause something that just affects investing in stocks or
does it also influence other areas of your life?
number)
Influences just
this particular
situation

(Circle one
Influences

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 all situa-

tions in my
life

72

15) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?
(Circle one number)
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Extremely
important

A FRIEND COMES TO YOU WITH A PROBLEM AND YOU DON'T TRY TO HELP THEM
16) Write down the ~ major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
17) Is the cause of your not helping your friend due to something
about you or something about other people or circumstances?
(Circle one number)
Totally due
to other people 1
or circumstances

2

3

4

5

6

7

Totally due
to me

18) In the future-when a friend comes to you with a problem, will
this cause again influence what happens? (Circle one number)
Will never
again influence 1
what happens

2

3

4

5

6

7

Will always
influence
what happens

19) Is the cause something that just affects what happens when a
friend comes to you with a problem or does it also influence
other areas of your life? (Circle one number)
Influences just
this particu1
lar situation

2

3

4

5

6

Influences
7 all situations in
my life

20) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?
(Circle one number)
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

YOU GIVE AN IMPORTANT TALK IN FRONT OF A GROUP
AND THE AUDIENCE REACT NEGATIVELY
21) Write down the

~

major cause

Extremely
important
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22) Is the cause of the audience reacting negatively due to something
about you or something about other people or circumstances?
(Circle one number)
Totally due to
other people
1
or circumstances

2

3

4

5

6

7

Totally due
to me

23) In the future when giving talks, will this cause again influence

what happens?

(Circle one number)

Will never
again influence 1
what happens

2

3

4

5

6

7

Will always
influence
what happens

24) Is this cause something that just influences giving talks or does
it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number)

Influences just
this particular 1
situation

2

3

4

5

6

7

Influences
all situations in
my life

25) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?
(Circle one number)

Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Extremely
important

YOU DO AN IMPORTANT PROJECT WITH A GROUP
AND FIND THAT THE PROJECT TURNS OUT WELL
26) Write down the one major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
27) Is the cause of the group working well together due to something

about you or something about the other people or circumstances?
(Circle one number)
Totally due to
other people
1
or circumstances

Totally due
2

3

4

5

6

7 to me

28) In the future when working on a group project, will this cause
again influence what happens? (Circle one number)
Will never again
influence
1
what happens

2

3

4

5

6

Will always
7 influence
what happens
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29) Is this cause something that just affects group projects or does
it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number)
Influences
just this
particular
situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

Influences
7 all situations in
my life

30) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?

(Circle one number)
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
7 important

YOU MEET A FRIEND WHO ACTS HOSTILELY TO YOU
31) Write down the ~ major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
32) Is the cause of your friend acting hostile due to something about

you or something about other people or circumstances?
one number)
Totally due
to other people 1
or circumstances

(Circle
Totally due

2

3

4

5

6

7 to me

33) In the future when interacting with friends, will this cause

again influence what happens?
Will never again
influence what
1
happens

2

(Circle one number)
3

4

5

6

Will always
7 influence
what happens

34) Is the cause something that just influences interacting with

friends or does it also influence other areas of your life?
(Circle one number)
Influences just
this particular
situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

Influences
7 all situations in
my life

35) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?
(Circle one number)
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
7 important
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YOU CAN'T GET ALL THE WORK DONE THAT OTHERS EXPECT OF YOU
36) Write down the ~ major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
37) Is the cause of your not getting the work done due to something

about you or something about the other people or circumstances?
(Circle one number)
Totally due to
other people
1
or circumstances

2

3

4

5

6

Totally due
7 to me

38) In the future when doing the work that others expect, will this

again influence what happens?
Will never again
influence
1
what happens

2

(Circle one number)
3

4

5

6

Will always
7 influence
what happens

39) Is the cause something that just affects doing work that others

expect you to do or does it also influence other areas of your
life? (Circle one number)
Influences just
this particular
situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

Influences
7 all situations in
my life

40) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?

(Circle one number)
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
7 important

YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE (BOYFRIEND/GIRLFRIEND) WERE HAVING PROBLEMS
GETTING ALONG BUT YOU WERE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES

41) Write down the one major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
42) Is the cause of the problems being resolve due to something about

you or something about other people or circumstances?
one number)
Totally due to
other people
1
or circumstances

(Circle
Totally due

2

3

4

5

6

7 to me
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43) In the future when trying to resolve problems, will this cause
again influence what happens?
Will never again
influence
1
what happens

2

(Circle one number)
3

4

5

6

Will always
7 influence
what happens

44) Is this cause something that just affects getting along with your
spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) or does it also influence other
areas of your life? (Circle one number)
Influences just
this particular
situation

Influences
1

2

3

4

5

6

7 all situa-

tions in
my life

45) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?

(Circle one number)
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
7 important

YOU APPLY FOR A POSITION THAT YOU WANT VERY BADLY (e.g., IMPORTANT
JOB, GRADUATE SCHOOL ADMISSION, etc.) AND YOU GET IT

47) Is the cause of your getting the position due to something about
you or something about other people or circumstances?
one number)
Totally due to
other people
1
or circumstances

(Circle
Totally due

2

3

4

5

6

7 to me

48) In the future when applying for a position, will this cause again

influence what happens?
Will never again
influence
1
what happens

(Circle one number)
2

3

4

5

6

Will always
7 influence
what happens

49) Is the cause something that just influences applying for a position or does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle
one number)

Influences just
this particular
situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

Influences
7 all situations in
my life
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50) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?
(Circle one number)
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
7 important

YOU GO OUT ON A DATE AND IT GOES BADLY

51) Write down the

~

major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

52) Is the cause of the date going badly due to something about you

or something about other people or circumstances?
one number)
Totally due to
other people
1
or circumstances

2

3

4

5

6

(Circle
Totally due
7 to me

53) In the future when dating, will this cause again influence what

happens?

(Circle one number)

Will never again
influence
1
what happens

2

3

4

5

6

Will always
7 influence
what happens

54) Is the cause something that just influences dating or does it also
influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number)
Influences just
this particular
situation

1

2

3

4

5

6

Influences
7 all situations in my
life

55) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?
(Circle one number)
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
7 important

YOU AND THE MEMBERS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD HAVE BEEN GETTING ALONG WELL
56) Write down the one major cause ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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57) Is the cause of your household getting along well due to something about you or something about the other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)
Totally due to
other people
1
or circumstances

Totally due
2

3

4

5

6

7 to me

58) In the future in your household, will this cause again influence
what happens? (Circle one number)
Will never again
influence
1
what happens

2

3

4

5

6

Will always
7 influence
what happens

59) Is the cause something that just affects how your household gets
along or does it also influence other areas of your life?
(Circle one number)
Influences jus-t
this particular 1
situation

2

3

4

5

6

Incluences
7 all situations in
my life

60) How important would this situation be if it happened to you?
(Circle one number)
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
7 important
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SAS2

ID number:
1. What grade did you achieve on this test (Circle one letter):
A

c

B

F

D

Answer the following questions in terms of how you feel at this
time. That is, your answers do not have to correspond with the
earlier questionnaire that you took if such answers would not
accurately reflect how you feel.
2. How do you evaluate this grade in terms of your own personal
standards? (Circle one choice)
Excellent

Very Good

Good

Fair

Poor

Very Poor

Terrible

3. Write down the one major cause of you performing as you did on this
test:

4. Is the cause of your test performance due to something about you
or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one
number)
Totally due to
other people
1
or circumstances

2

3

4

5

6

7

Totally due
to me

5. In the future when taking tests, will this cause again influence
what happens?
Will never again
influence
1
what happens

2

3

4

5

6

7

Will always
influence
what happens

6. Is this cause something that just influences academic test performance or does it also influence other areas of your life?
Influences just
this particular 1
situation

2

3

4

5

6

7

Influences all
situations in
my life

7. How important to you is your performance on this particular test?
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Extremely
important
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8. How important to you is academic performance in general?
Not at all
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Extremely
important

9. How much time on this test did you spend thinking and/or wondering
about how you were doing on the test?
Very little
time

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much
time
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